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Abstract
Smart Meters (SMs) are an important component of smart electrical grids, but they have also generated
serious concerns about privacy data of consumers. In this paper, we present a general formulation of the
privacy-preserving problem in SMs from an information-theoretic perspective. In order to capture the casual
time series structure of the power measurements, we employ Directed Information (DI) as an adequate
measure of privacy. On the other hand, to cope with a variety of potential applications of SMs data, we study
different distortion measures along with the standard squared-error distortion. This formulation leads to a quite
general training objective (or loss) which is optimized under a deep learning adversarial framework where
two Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs), referred to as the releaser and the attacker, are trained with opposite
goals. An exhaustive empirical study is then performed to validate the proposed approach for different privacy
problems in three actual data sets. Finally, we study the impact of the data mismatch problem, which occurs
when the releaser and the attacker have different training data sets and show that privacy may not require a
large level of distortion in real-world scenarios.
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2I. Introduction
SMART Meters (SMs) are a cornerstone for the development of smart electrical grids. Thesedevices are able to report power consumption measurements of a house to an utility provider
at every hour or even at every few minutes. This feature generates a considerably amount of useful
data which enables several applications in almost real-time such as power quality monitoring, timely
fault detection, demand response, energy theft prevention, etc. [1]–[3]. However, this fine-grained
power consumption monitoring poses a thread to consumers privacy. In fact, it has been shown that
simple algorithms, known in general as NonIntrusive Load Monitoring (NILM) methods, can readily
be used to infer the types of appliances being used at a home in a given time, even without any
prior knowledge about the household [4]. Since these features are highly correlated with the presence
of people at the dwelling and their personal habits [5], this induces serious privacy concerns which
can have an impact on the acceptance and deployment pace of SMs [6], [7]. The natural challenge
raised here is: how privacy can be enhanced while preserving the utility of the data? Although this
problem has been widely studied in the context of data science [8], the time series structure of SMs
data requires a particular treatment [9]. For further details the reader may be referred to [5].
Simple approaches for privacy-preserving in the context of SMs include data aggregation and
encryption [10], [11], the use of pseudonyms rather than the real identities of users [12], downsam-
pling of the data [13], [14] and random noise addition [15]. However, these methods often restrict
the potential applications of the SMs data. For instance, domwnsampling of the data may incur in
time delays to detect critical events, while data aggregation degrades the positioning and accuracy
of the power measurements.
A formal approach to the privacy problem has been presented in [16] from an information-theoretic
persepctive, where it has been proposed to assess privacy by the Mutual Information (MI) between
the sensitive and released variables. More specifically, the authors model the power measurements
of SMs with a hidden Markov model in which the distribution of the measurements is controlled
by the state of the appliances, and for each particular state the distribution of power consumption
is modeled as Gaussian. This model is then used to obtain the privacy-utility trade-off using tools
from rate-distortion theory [17]. Although this approach is very appealing it has s two important
limitations for its application to real-time scenarios with actual data. First, the privacy measure does
3not capture the causal time dependence and processing of the data, which is an essential feature of
the problem. Second, the Gaussian model is quite restrictive in practice. The first limitation has been
addressed in [18], where it is shown that for, an online scenario, the privacy measure should be based
on Directed Information (DI) [19], which is the privacy measure that we will adopt in the present
work. We will further address the second limitation by taking a data-based approach in which no
explicit constraints on the distributions or statistics of the involved variables are assumed.
A more sophisticated approach considers the use of Rechargeable Batteries (RBs) and Renewable
Energy Sources (RES) in homes in order to modify the actual energy consumption of users with
the goal of hiding the sensitive information [20]–[26]. Many of these works borrow ideas from the
well-known principle of differential privacy [27], which seems to be better suited for fixed databases
than for time series data [9]. The main motivation to introduce the use of physical resources into
the privacy problem comes from the observation that this approach does not require any distortion
in the actual SMs measurements, which means that there is no loss in terms of utility. However,
the incorporation of physical resources does not only make the problem more complex and limited
in scope, but can also generate a significant cost to users due to the faster wear of the RBs as a
consequence of the increased charging/discharging rate [5]. On the other hand, the required level
of distortion for a specific privacy goal in a realistic scenario in which the attacker threatening
privacy has only partial information is still an open question. Thus, the need and convenience of
these solutions is questionable. As a matter of fact, in this work, we show that under some conditions
the privacy-utility trade-off may be much less severe than expected. However, it is important to note
that these approaches are complementary to the ones based on distorting the power measurements
rather than alternative. Thus, for simplicity, we assume that no RBs and/or RESs are available and
distortion is the only mean to achieve a desired privacy level.
The use of neural networks to model an attacker has been considered in [28]. However, a more
powerful formulation of the problem assumes that both the releaser (or privatizer) and the attacker
are deep neural networks (DNNs) that are trained simultaneously based on a minimax game, an idea
that is inspired by the well-known Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [29]. This concept can
be referred to as Generative Adversarial Privacy (GAP) [30] and is the basis for our approach. It
should be mentioned that the concept of GAP has been studied for different applications related to
4images [31], [32] but, to the best of our knowledge, not in the context of SMs time series data. In
these works, the authors consider i.i.d. data and deep feed-forward neural networks for the releaser
and attacker, while in this paper we consider deep Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) to capture
and exploit the time correlation. The idea of time-series generation with an adversarial approach
has been considered in [33] for medical data based in the principle of differential privacy. As we
mentioned previously, our approach is instead based on the DI, an information-theoretic measure of
privacy.
In summary, the main contributions of this paper are the following:
(i) We applied DI as a privacy measure similarly to [18]. However, unlike this and previous works,
we impose no explicit assumptions on the generating model of the power measurements, but
take a more versatile data-driven approach.
(ii) We study different possible distortion measures which provide more flexibility to control the
specific features to be preserved in the released signals that is, the relevant features for the
target applications.
(iii) For the sake of computational tractability, we propose a loss function for training the privacy-
preserving releaser based on an upper bound to DI. Then, considering an attacker that minimizes
a standard cross-entropy loss, we show that this leads to an adversarial framework based on
two RNNs to train the releaser.
(iv) We perform an extensive statistical study with actual data from three different data sets and
frameworks motivated by real-world theaters to characterize the utility-privacy trade-offs and
the nature of the distortion generated by the releaser network.
(v) We investigate the data mismatch problem in the context of SMs privacy, which occurs when
the data available to the attacker is not the same as the one used for training the releaser
mechanism, and show that it has an important impact on the privacy-utility trade-off.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the theoretical formulation
of the problem that motivates the loss functions for the releaser and attacker. Then, in Section III, the
privacy-preserving adversarial framework is introduced along with the training algorithm. Extensive
results are presented and discussed in Section IV. Finally, some concluding remarks are presented
in Section V.
5Notation and conventions
• XT = (X1, . . . , XT ) : A sequence of random variables, or a time series, of length T ;
• xT = (x1, x2, . . . , xT ): A realization of XT ;
• x(i)T = (x(i)1 , x
(i)
2 , . . . , x
(i)
T ): The i
th sample in a minibatch used for training;
• E[X]: The expectation of a random variable X;
• pX: The distribution of X;
• I(X; Y): Mutual information between random variables X and Y [17];
• H(X): Entropy of random variable X;
• I(XT → YT ): Directed information between two time series XT and YT ;
• H(XT ||YT ): Causally conditional entropy of XT given YT [34];
• X −
− Y −
− Z: Markov chain among X, Y and Z.
II. Problem Formulation and Training Loss
A. Main definitions
Consider the private time series XT , the utile process YT , and the observed signal WT . We assume
that Xt takes values on a fixed discrete alphabet X, for each t ∈ {1, . . . ,T }. A releaser Rθ (this notation
is used to denote that the releaser is controlled by a vector of parameters θ) produces the release
process as Zt based on the observation W t, for each time t ∈ {1, . . . ,T }, while an attacker Aφ attempts
to infer Xt based on Zt by finding an approximation of pXT |ZT , which we shall denote by pXˆT |ZT . Thus,
the Markov chain (Xt,Y t)−
−W t −
− Zt −
− Xˆt holds for all t ∈ {1, . . . ,T }. In addition, due to causality,
the distribution pZT XˆT |WT can be decomposed as follows:
pZT XˆT |WT (z
T , xˆT |wT ) =
T∏
t=1
pZt |W t(zt|wt)pXˆt |Zt(xˆt|zt). (1)
The goal of the releaser Rθ is to minimize the flow of information from the sensitive process XT
to XˆT while simultaneously keeping the distortion between the release time series ZT and the useful
signal YT small. On the other hand, the goal of the attacker Aφ (again, this notation is used to denote
that the attacker is controlled by a vector of parameters φ) is to learn the optimal decision rule based
on the distribution pXt |Zt , for each t, as accurately as possible. Note that after the approximation pXˆt |Zt
6is obtained, the attacker can estimate the realization xT corresponding to zT in an online fashion, by
solving the following T problems:
argmax
xˆt∈X
pXˆt |Zt(xˆt|zt), t ∈ {1, . . . ,T }. (2)
Thus, the attacker can be interpreted as an hypothesis test, as stated in [35]. However, in the present
case, we consider the more realistic scenario in which the statistical test is suboptimal due to the
fact that the attacker has no access to the actual conditional distributions pXt |Zt but only to pXˆt |Zt , i.e.,
an inference of them.
In order to take into account the causal relation between XT and XˆT , the flow of information is
quantified by DI [19]:
I(XT → XˆT ) ,
T∑
t=1
I(Xt; Xˆt|Xˆt−1), (3)
where I(Xt; Xˆt|Xˆt−1) is the conditional mutual information between Xt and Xˆt conditioned on Xˆt−1
[17]. The normalized expected distortion between ZT and YT is defined as:
D(ZT ,YT ) , E[d(Z
T ,YT )]
T
, (4)
where d : RT × RT → R is any distortion function (i.e., a metric on RT ). To ensure the quality of
the release, it is natural to impose the following constraint: D(ZT ,YT ) ≤ ε for some given ε ≥ 0.
In previous works, the normalized squared error was considered as a distortion function (e.g., [16]).
Beside this, other distortion measures can be relevant whithin the framework of SMs. For instance,
demand response programs usually require an accurate knowledge of peak power consumption, so
a distortion function closer to the infinity norm would be more meaningful for those particular
applications. Thus, for the sake of generality and to keep the distortion function simple, we propose
to use an `p distance:
d(zT , yT ) , ‖zt − yt‖p=
 T∑
t=1
|zt − yt|p

1/p
, (5)
where p ≥ 2 is a fix parameter. Note that this distortion function contains the squared error case as
a particular case for p = 2 while it converges to the maximum error between the components of zT
and yT as p→ ∞.
7Therefore, the problem of finding an optimal releaser Rθ subject to the aforementioned attacker
Aφ and distortion constraint can be formally written as follows:
min
θ
I
(
XT → XˆT
)
,
s.t. D(ZT ,YT ) ≤ ε. (6)
Note that the solution to this optimization problem depends on pXˆT |ZT , i.e., the conditional distributions
that represent the attacker Aφ. Thus, a joint optimization of the releaser Rθ and the attacker Aφ is
required.
B. A novel training loss
The optimization problem in (6) can be exploited to motivate an objective function for Rθ. However,
note that the cost of computing DI term is O(|X|T ), where |X| is the size of X. Thus, for the sake of
tractability, DI will be replaced with the following surrogate upper bound:
I
(
XT → XˆT
)
=
T∑
t=1
[
H(Xˆt|Xˆt−1) − H(Xˆt|Xˆt−1, Xt)
]
(i)≤
T∑
t=1
[
H(Xˆt|Xˆt−1) − H(Xˆt|Xˆt−1, Xt,Zt)
]
(ii)
,
T∑
t=1
[
H(Xˆt|Xˆt−1) − H(Xˆt|Zt)
]
(iii)≤ T log|X|−
T∑
t=1
H(Xˆt|Zt)
(iv)
= constant − H(XˆT ‖ZT ), (7)
where (i) is due to the fact that conditioning reduces entropy; equality (ii) is due to the Markov
chains Xt −
−Zt −
− Xˆt and Xˆt−1−
−Zt −
− Xˆt; (iii) is due to the trivial bound H(Xˆt|Xˆt−1) ≤ H(Xˆt) ≤ log|X|;
and (iv) follows by the definition of the causally conditional entropy [34] and the Markov chain
Xˆt−1 −
− Zt −
− Xˆt. Therefore, the loss function for Rθ can be written as:
LR(θ, φ, λ) = D(ZT ,YT ) − λT H(Xˆ
T ‖ZT ), (8)
8where λ ≥ 0 controls the privacy-utility trade-off and the factor 1/T has been introduced for
normalization purposes. It should be noted that, for λ = 0, the loss function LR(θ, φ, λ) reduces
to the expected distortion, being independent from the attacker Aφ. In such scenario, Rθ offers no
privacy guarantees. Conversely, for very large values of λ, the loss function LR(θ, φ, λ) is dominated
by the upper bound on DI, so that privacy is the only goal of Rθ. In this regime, we expect the
attacker Aφ to fail completely to infer XT , i.e., to approach to random guessing performance.
On the other hand, the attacker Aφ is a classifier which optimizes the following cross-entropy loss:
LA(φ) , 1T
T∑
t=1
E
[
− log pXˆt |Zt(Xt|Zt)
]
, (9)
where the expectation should be understood w.r.t. pXtZt . It is important to note that
LA(φ) = 1T
T∑
t=1
E
[
− log pXˆt |Zt(Xˆt|Zt)
]
+ E
log pXˆt |Zt(Xˆt|Zt)pXˆt |Zt(Xt|Zt)

≥ 1
T
H(XˆT ‖ZT ), (10)
since the second term in (10) is a Kullback-Leibler divergence, which is non-negative. Thus, by
minimizing LR, the releaser is preventing the attacker from inferring the sensitive process while also
minimizing the distortion between the useful and released processes. This shows that Rθ and Aφ are
indeed trained in an adversarial fashion. It should be noted that Aφ here is an artificial attacker used
for training Rθ. Once the training is complete, and Rθ is fixed, a new attacker should be trained from
scratch, using the loss (9), in order to assess the privacy-utility trade-off in an unbiased way.
III. Privacy-Preserving Adversarial Learning
Based on the previous theoretical formulation, an adversarial modeling framework consisting of
two RNNs, a releaser Rθ and an attacker Aφ, is considered (see Fig. 1). Note that independent noise
UT is appended to WT in order to randomize the released variables ZT , which is a popular approach
in privacy-preserving methods. In addition, the available theoretical results show that, for Gaussian
distributions, the optimal release contains such a noise component [16], [36]. For both networks, a
LSTM architecture is selected (see Fig. 2), which was shown to be successful in several problems
dealing with sequences of data (e.g., see [37] and references therein for more details). Training in
the suggested framework is performed using the Algorithm 1 which requires k gradient steps to train
9Fig. 1. Privacy-Preserving framework. The seed noise UT is generated from i.i.d. samples according to a uniform distribution:
Ut ∼ U[0, 1].
Aφ followed by one gradient step to train Rθ. It is worth to emphesize that k should be larger than
1 in order to ensure that Aφ represents a strong attacker. However, if k is too large, this could lead
to an overfitting and thus a poor attacker.
Fig. 2. LSTM recurrent network cell diagram. The cell includes four gating units to control the flow of information. All the gating
units have a sigmoid activation function (σ) except for the input unit (that uses an hyperbolic tangent activation function (tanh) by
default). The parameters b,V,W are respectively biases, input weights, and recurrent weights. In the LSTM architecture, the forget
gate ft = σ(b f + K f ht−1 + V f wt) uses the output of the previous cell (which is called hidden state ht−1) to control the cell state Ct to
remove irrelevant information. On the other hand, the input gate gt = σ(bg + Kght−1 + Vgwt) and input unit adds new information to
Ct from the current input. Finally, the output gate ot = σ(bo + Koht−1 + Vowt) generates the output of the cell from the current input
and cell state.
IV. Results and Discussion
A. Description of data sets
Three different data sets are considered:
• The Electricity Consumption & Occupancy (ECO) data set, collected and published by [38],
which includes 1 Hz power consumption measurements and occupancy information of five
10
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for training privacy-preserving data releaser neural network.
Input: Data set (which includes sample sequences of useful data yT , sensitive data xt); seed noise
samples uT ; seed noise dimension m; batch size B; number of steps to apply to the attacker k; gradient
clipping value C; `2 recurrent regularization parameter β.
Output: Releaser network Rθ.
1: for number of training iterations do
2: for k steps do
3: Sample minibatch of B examples: B =
{
w(b)T =
(
x(b)T , y(b)T , u(b)T
)
; b = 1, 2, . . . , B
}
.
4: Compute the gradient of LA(φ), approximated with the minibatch B, w.r.t. to φ.
5: Update the attacker by applying the RMSprop optimizer with clipping value C.
6: end for
7: Sample minibatch of B examples: B =
{
w(b)T =
(
x(b)T , y(b)T , u(b)T
)
; b = 1, 2, . . . , B
}
.
8: Compute the gradient of LR(θ, φ, λ), approximated with the minibatch B, w.r.t. to θ.
9: Use Ridge(L2) recurrent regularization with value β and update the releaser by applying
RMSprop optimizer with clipping value C.
10: end for
houses in Swiss over a period of 8 months. In this study, we re-sampled the data to have hourly
samples.
• The Pecan Street data set contains hourly SMs data of houses in Texas, Austin and was collected
by Pecan Street Inc. [39]. Pecan Street project is a smart grid demonstration research program
which provides electricity, water, natural gas, and solar energy generation measurements for over
1000 houses in Texas, Austin.
• The Low Carbon London (LCL) data set, which includes half-hourly energy consumption for
more than 5000 households over the period 2011 − 2014 in London [40]. Each household is
allocated to a CACI Acorn group [41], which includes three categories: affluent, comfortable
and adversity.
We model the time dependency over each day, so the data sets were reshaped to sample sequences
of length 24 for ECO and Pecan Street (data rate of 1 sample per hour) while sample sequences of
length 48 were used for LCL data set (data rate of 1 sample per half hour). For the ECO, Pecan
Street, and LCL data sets, a total number of 11225, 9120, and 19237 sample sequences were collected,
respectively. The data sets were splitted into train and test sets with a ratio of roughly 85:15 while
10% of the training data is used as the validation set. The network architectures and hyperparameters
used for training and test in the different applications are summarized in Table I.
To assess the distortion with respect to the actual power consumption measurements, we define
11
TABLE I
Model architectures and hyperparameters values used for each application.
SMs Application Releaser Training Attacker Test Attacker B k m
Inference of households occupancy 4 LSTM layers eachwith 64 cells and β = 1.5
2 LSTM layers each
with 32 cells
3 LSTM layers each
with 32 cells 128 4 8
Inference of households identity 6 LSTM layers eachwith 128 cells and β = 2
4 LSTM layers each
with 32 cells
4 LSTM layers each
with 32 cells 128 5 3
Inference of households acron type 5 LSTM layers eachwith 100 cells and β = 0.1
3 LSTM layers each
with 32 cells
4 LSTM layers each
with 32 cells 128 7 3
the Normalized Error (NE) for the different `p distortion functions as follows:
NEp ,
E
[
‖YT − ZT ‖p
]
E
[
‖YT ‖p
] . (11)
B. `2 Distortion
First, the `2 distortion function is considered (i.e., p = 2 in (5)). In the following subsections, three
different privacy applications are studied (one for each of the data sets presented in Section IV-A).
1) Inference of households occupancy: The first practical case of study regarding privacy-preserving
in time series data is the concern of inferring presence/absence of residents at home from the total
power consumption collected by SMs [42], [43]. For this application, the electricity consumption
measurements from the ECO data set are considered as the useful data, while occupancy labels are
defined as the private data. Therefore, in this case, the releaser attempts to minimize a trade-off
between the distortion of the total electricity consumption incurred and the probability of inferring
the presence of an individual at home from the release signal. Note from Table I that a stronger
attacker composed of 3 LSTM layers is used for the test.
In Fig. 3 we show the empirically found privacy-utility trade-off for this application. Note that by
adding the distortion the accuracy of the attacker changes from more than 80% (no privacy) to 50%
(full privacy), which corresponds to the performance of a random guessing classifier.
In order to provide more insights about the release mechanism, the Power Spectrum Density (PSD)
of the input signal and the PSD of the error signal for three different cases along the privacy-utility
trade-off curve of Fig. 3 are estimated using Welch’s method [44]. For each case, we use 10 release
signals and average the PSD estimates to reduce the variance of the estimator. Results are shown in
Fig. 4. Looking at the PSD of the input signal (useful data), some harmonics are clearly visible. The
12
Fig. 3. Privacy-utility trade-off for house occupancy inference application. Since in this application the attacker is a binary classifier,
the random guessing (balanced) accuracy is 50%. The fitted curve is based on an exponential function and is included only for
illustration purposes.
PSD of the error signals show that the model controls the trade-off in privacy-utility by modifying
the floor noise and the distortion on these harmonics.
Fig. 4. PSD of the actual electricity consumption and error signals for the house occupancy inference application.
It should be mentioned that two stationary tests, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test [45] and the
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Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (KPSS) test [46], were applied to the data. This confirmed
that there is enough evidence to suggest the data is stationary, thus supporting our PSD analysis.
2) Inference of household identity: The second practical case of study regarding privacy preser-
vation in SMs measurements is identity recognition from total power consumption of households
[12]. It is assumed that both the releaser and the attacker have access to the total power consumption
of different households in a region (training data), and then the attacker attempts to determine the
identity of a house using the released data obtained from the test data. Thus, our model aims at
generating release data of total power consumption of households in a way that prevents the attacker
to perform the identity recognition while keeping distortion on the total power minimized. For this
task, total power consumption of five houses is used.
The empirical privacy-utility trade-off curve obtained for this application is presented in Fig. 5.
Comparing Fig. 5 with Fig. 3, we see that a high level of privacy requires a high level of distortion.
For instance, in order to obtain an attacker accuracy of 30 %, NE2 should be approximately equal to
0.30. This is attributed to the fact that this task is harder from the learning viewpoint than the one
considered in Section IV-B1.
Fig. 5. Privacy-utility trade-off for house identity inference application. Since in this application the attacker is a five-class classifier,
the random guessing (balanced) accuracy is 20%. The fitted curve is based on an exponential function and is included only for
illustration purposes.
3) Inference of households acorn type: As the third practical case of study, we consider the family
acorn type identification which can reveal the family economic status to any third-party having access
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to the SMs data [47]. Thus, for this application, the SMs power consumption is used as useful data
while the acorn type is considered as private one.
The empirical privacy-utility trade-off curve obtained for this application is presented in Fig. 6.
Once again, we see a large variation in the accuracy of the attacker as the distortion is modified.
Fig. 6. Privacy-utility trade-off for acorn type inference application. Since in this application the attacker is a three-class classifier, the
random guessing (balanced) accuracy is 33%. The fitted curve is based on an exponential function and is included only for illustration
purposes.
It should be noted that the PSD analysis for this application and the previous one lead to similar
results to the ones of the first application and therefore are not reported.
To assess the quality of the release signal, utility providers may be interested in several different
indicators. These include, for instance, the mean, skewness, kurtosis, standard deviation to mean ratio,
and maximum to mean ratio [48]. Thus, for completeness, we present these indicators in Table II for
three different cases along the privacy-utility trade off curve. These results show that in general the
error in these indicators is small when the privacy constraints are lax and increases as they become
strict. Whereas no simple relation can be expected between NE2 and the values of the corresponding
indicators.
C. `p Distortion
As already discussed in Section II, the distortion function should be properly matched to the
intended application of the release variables ZT in order to preserve the characteristics of the target
15
TABLE II
Errors in power quality indicators for three applications along the privacy-utility trade-off.
SMs Application NE2 Accuracy(%)
Absolute relative error of quality indicators(%)
Mean Skewness Kurtosis Std. Dev./Mean Max./Mean
Inference of households occupancy
0.04 78 1.42 1.06 0.70 0.67 0.46
0.12 65 9.69 4.32 5.81 4.58 4.92
0.18 57 13.26 12.83 2.57 16.44 13.89
Inference of households identity
0.05 54 3.42 2.22 2.01 3.50 2.51
0.17 39 4.63 3.18 1.79 15.74 9.32
0.36 29 12.49 6.71 1.44 19.12 9.98
Inference of households acron type
0.03 85 1.86 0.66 0.44 0.02 0.02
0.29 47 2.49 9.46 14.54 24.97 13.24
0.60 35 13.21 45.92 24.03 55.38 41.68
variables YT that are considered essential. In this section, we consider the `p distortion (5) with
p = 4, 5 as an alternative to the `2 distortion function in Section and study their potential benefits.
The privacy-utility trade-off curve for the inference of households occupancy application is shown
in Fig. 7. As a first observation, it appears clear that the choice of the distortion measure has a
non-negligible impact on the privacy-utility trade-off curve. In fact, it can be seen that for a given
amount of distortion, the releasers trained with the `4 and `5 distortion measures achieve a higher
level of privacy than the one trained with the `2 distortion function. It should be mentioned that we
also considered other norms, such as the `10, and the privacy-utility trade-off was observed to be
similar, but slightly better, than the one corresponding to the `4 norm.
Fig. 7. Privacy-utility trade-off for house occupancy inference application based on the different `p distortion functions. For each
figure, the dashed line, shown for comparison purposes, is the fitted curve found in Fig. 3 for the `2 distortion function.
As we discussed in Section II, in demand response programs, the utilities are mostly interested
in the peak power consumption of the customers. It is also expected that higher-order `p norms are
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better at preserving these signal characteristics than the `2 norm. To verify this notion, we considered
60 random days of the ECO data set in a full privacy scenario (i.e., with an attacker accuracy very
close to 50%) and plotted the actual power consumption along with the corresponding release signals
for both the `4 and `2 distortion functions. Results are shown in Fig. 8, which clearly indicates that
the number of peaks preserved by the releaser trained with the `4 distortion function is much higher
than the ones kept by the releaser trained with the `2 distortion function. This suggests that for the
demand response application, higher order `p distortion functions should be considered.
Fig. 8. Example of the release power consumption in the time domain compared with the actual power consumption over 60 random
days with almost full privacy for the `4 and `2 distortion functions.
D. Attacker with Data Mismatch Problem
All the previous results are based on the assumption that the attacker has access to exactly the
same training data set used by the releaser. This case should be considered as a worst-case analysis
of the performance of the privacy-preserving networks. However, this assumption may not be true in
practice. To examine this scenario, we revisit the application of Section IV-B1 in two different cases.
In the first case, we assume that out of the data set of five houses (ECO data set), the releaser uses
the data of houses {1, 2, 4, 5| for training while the attacker has access to just the data of house 3. In
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the second case, we assume that releaser is trained by the the data set of all houses but just the data
set of houses 1 and 3 are available to the attacker. These scenarios try to capture different degrees
of a data mismatch problem, which could have an impact on the privacy-utility trade-off due to the
different generalization errors.
The results are presented in Fig. 9 along with the worst-case scenario. This clearly shows how
the overlapping of the training data sets of the releaser and the attacker affect the performance of
the model. In fact, in the case where the attacker does not have access to the full data set of the
releaser but a portion of that, the performance of the attacker largely degrades, which means that a
target level of privacy requires much less distortion. In the extreme case where the attacker has no
access to the releaser training data set, a very high level of privacy can be achieved with negligible
distortion. This should be considered as a best-case scenario. It should be mentioned that we repeated
this experiment with different shuffling of the houses and similar results were obtained.
Fig. 9. Privacy-utility trade-off for house occupancy inference application when an attacker (trained separately to infer private data
from the release) does not have full access to the releaser training data set.
V. Summary and Discussion
Privacy problems associated with smart meters measurements are an important concern in society,
which can have an impact on their deployment pace and the advancement of smart grid technologies.
Thus, it is essential to understand the real privacy risks associated with them in order to provide an
adequate solution to this problem.
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In this paper, we proposed to measure the privacy based on Directed Information (DI) between
the sensitive time series and its inference by a potential attacker optimized for that task. DI captures
the causal time dependencies present in the time series data and its processing. Unlike previous
approaches, we impose no explicit assumption on the statistics or distributions of the involved random
variables. We believe that this data-driven approach can provide a more accurate assessment of the
information leakage in practice than purely theoretical studies based on worst-case assumptions.
We considered a privacy-preserving adversarial learning framework that balances the trade-off
between privacy and distortion on release data. More precisely, we defined a tractable training
objective (or loss) based on an upper bound to DI and a general distortion measure. The desired
releaser is then trained in an adversarial framework using RNNs to optimize such objective, while
an artificial attacker is trained with an opposite goal. After convergence, a new attacker is trained to
test the level of privacy achieved by the releaser. A detailed study of different applications, including
inference of households occupancy (ECO data set), inference of household identity (Pecan Street data
set), and inference of household acorn type (LCL data set), shows that the privacy-utility trade-off
is strongly dependent upon the considered application and distortion measure. We showed that the
usual `p-norm based distortion measure for p = 2 can have a worse privacy-utility trade-off than for
p > 2. In addition, we showed that the `4 distortion measure generates a release that preserves most
of the power consumption peaks even under a full privacy regime, which is not the case for the `2
distortion function. This result is of considerable importance for demand response applications.
Finally, we studied the impact of the data mismatch problem in this application, which occurs when
the training data set of the releaser is not the same as the one used by the attacker. Results show
that this effect can greatly affect the privacy-utility trade-off. Since this phenomenon is expected in
practice, at least to some degree, these findings suggest that the level of required distortion to achieve
desired privacy targets may not be too significant in several cases of interest. In such scenarios, our
approach may offer a simpler and more general solution than the ones offered by methods based on
rechargeable batteries and renewable energy sources.
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